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I. INTRODUCTION
Equity is widely acknowledged to be an important
goal in the field of health care. Indeed, McLachlan
and Maynard (1982) have gone so far as to suggest
that' the vast majority of the population would elect
for equity to be the prime consideration' (p. 556)—a
view endorsed by Mooney (1986, p. 145). Several
researchers have investigated how successful their
own country's delivery and/or financing system is
in achieving its stated equity goals. In general the
strategy of these studies is to compare the current
situation with some ideal or 'target* situation. Le
Grand (1978), for example, in what has become a
classic study in the field, compares the distributions
across socio-economic groups of illness and public
expenditure on health care in Britain in 1972, and
concludes that the National Health Service (NHS)
has failed to achieve equity in the delivery of health
care.1
Though studies such as Le Grand's are extremely
valuable, an arguably more interesting strategy is to
compare the current situation, not simply with
1
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2
 Lc Grand finds that 'the top socioeconomic group (professionals, employers and managers) receives 40 per cent more
NHS expenditure per person reporting illness than the bottom one (semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers)' (Le Grand,
1982, p. 46).
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some ideal distribution, but with a situation that
prevailed before (for example: is the NHS becoming
more or less equitable?) or with the situation
prevailing in other types of health care system (for
example: does the NHS fare better than the French
health care system?). In other words, studies of a
comparative nature may be more relevant for policy
purposes than studies appraising a system only
relative to some ideal (and possibly unattainable)
state.
Under the auspices of the European Community
(EC), researchers from ten countries have recently
begun collaborating on a comparative study of this
type.3 The project's initial aim is to facilitate com-
parisons of the distributional consequences of alter-
native health care financing and delivery systems.
Later it is planned to examine the distributional
consequences of specific cost containment meas-
ures. It is hoped that the project will allow partici-
pants to address issues such as: would country X's
equity goals be better served if it moved closer to
country Y's delivery system? If so, which particu-
lar facets of the delivery system should it try to
emulate? Would adoption by country X of country
Y's financing system be desirable given country
X's equity objectives? What can country X leam
about the distributional effects of co-payments
from country Y's recent experience? And so on.
The idea of a comparative study of health care
systems is, of course, not a new one. The EC study
differs, however, from the majority of previous
comparative studies in at least three respects. First,
it has distributional themes as its prime concern.
Though there are exceptions (see e.g. Le Grand and
Rabin, 1986; Le Grand, 1987a), previous studies
have tended to be directed at other issues (Culyer,
1987, p. 26). The studies of Maynard (1975) and
Maxwell (1981), for example, both compare health
care systems, but are largely descriptive and seem
to have been motivated mainly out of efficiency
considerations (see e.g. Maynard, 1975, p. 267).
Studies along the lines of that of Newhouse (1976)
and Parkin et al. (1987) also compare health care
systems, but aim at explaining international variations
in expenditure. The second difference is that the EC
study employs micro-level data, whereas previous
empirical studies of a comparative nature have
almost all been based on aggregate data. This
switch to the use of micro-level data in international
comparisons has already occurred elsewhere in
social policy analysis (Smeeding et al., 1985;
Atkinson, 1987). The third difference is that, in the
EC study, the analysis for each country is being
undertaken, for the most part, by citizens of the
country in question. This contrasts with previous
comparative studies in the health field where one
researcher tends to perform the analysis for all the
countries in the study (e.g. Abel Smith, 1984).
This paper outlines some of the methods currently
being used in the EC study and presents some
tentative cross-country comparisons using data from
Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United
States. It examines equity in both the finance of
health care and in its delivery.
In section II we explore the question 'What is
equity', summarizing various important distinctions
that have been made in the health economics literature
regarding this concept. Section III considers the
problem of defining equity. Section IV investigates
the issue of measuring it. This is a topic that has
received hardly any attention at all in the health
economics literature but is clearly crucial if cross-
country comparisons are to be performed. In section
IV we outline some measurement methods that
might be employed. We then employ these measures
in section V to analyse equity in the finance and
delivery of health care in our four countries. The
final section contains a summary and a discussion.
II. WHAT IS EQUITY?
Equity, like efficiency, is a goal that is pursued by
policy-makers in all types of health care systems
(McLachlan and Maynard, 1982). There is, how-
ever, much less agreement over what constitutes
equity than there is over what constitutes effi-
ciency: as McLachlan and Maynard (op. ciL) note,
'. . . equity, like beauty, is in the mind of the
beholder...' (p. 520). Not all individuals subscribe
to the same concept of equity: contrary to what is
often suggested, for example, not everyone takes
the view that equity is about equality. Moreover,
distributional issues do not always concern equity:
3
 The project forms one of several projects in the EC-COMAC Health Services Research programme. The ten countries
include eight EC countries and two non-EC countries.
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they may arise from feelings of compassion or
altruism. This too is a distinction that is not gener-
ally appreciated: distributional goals and equity
goals are typically viewed as one and the same. In
this section we examine the principal concepts of
equity and consider the extent to which support for
each varies across countries. We begin, however,
with the distinction between distributional goals
that derive from equity considerations and those
that do not
(i) Equity versus Altruism
Distributional objectives in health care, and in
social policy generally, can arise from two sources.
First, they can arise from considerations of social
justice and fairness (i.e. equity). In other words an
equitable distribution of health care would be one
that is considered to be fair or just. Alternatively,
distributional objectives can arise from feelings of
altruism or caring. The concepts of equity and
altruism are often confused.4 Equity and altruism
are, however, as Culyer (1980) and Goodin and Le
Grand (1987) emphasize, quite distinct and have
quite different implications for health policy.5
Caring and altruism are matters of preference. In
the context of health care a caring individual might
be one who derives utility—i.e. an external benefit
—from seeing another person receiving health care
(Culyer, 1980). In this case the caring individual
prefers that the person in question receives health
care and is prepared to sacrifice resources to ensure
that the person actually obtains treatment. Quite
how much he is prepared to sacrifice will depend on
how much he cares (which will depend on inter alia
his income) and on the cost of providing health
care. Alternatively a caring individual might be one
that derives utility from the act of providing health
care for others (Mooney, 1986). Quite how much of
his income the individual will be prepared to sacri-
fice to provide health care for others will depend on
the utility he derives from the act of providing
medical care (which again will depend on his
income) and on the cost of providing health care.
With caring preferences of either type, therefore,
'costs and benefits are balanced at the margin and
. . . the level of provision i s . . . determined by the
wealth of the community' (Culyer, 1980, p. 70).
The language of caring is thus the language of
efficiency. Hence the term 'Pareto optimal redistri-
bution' (Hochman and Rodgers, 1969).
Social justice or equity, on the other hand, is not a
matter of individual preference. In the words of
Culyer (op. cit.):
. . . the source of value for making judgements about
equity lies outside, or is extrinsic to, preferences....
The whole point of making a judgement about justice is
so to frame it that it is (and can be seen to be) a
judgement made independently of the interests of the
individual making it. (p. 60.)
Social justice thus derives from a set of principles
concerning what a person ought to have as of right.
The different motivations behind equity and caring
have at least two important implications for health
care policy. First, decisions regarding health care
provision prompted by considerations of social
justice ought not to be influenced by cost: justice
requires that an equitable pattern of provision be
ensured, irrespective of the cost to the rest of society
(Culyer, 1980, pp. 69-70). Second, there is scope
for conflict between efficiency and equity: an effi-
cient redistributional programme prompted by caring
preferences need not be equitable, and vice versa
(Culyer, 1980, p. 98).
For some purposes it may not be important to be
able to separate out considerations of equity from
considerations of altruism. One might be content to
analyse the extent to which society's stated
distributional goals—however motivated—are being
achieved. This strategy is explicitly adopted by Le
Grand (1982) and Goodin and Le Grand (1987). In
the light of the discussion above, though, this is not
altogether satisfactory. Ideally, one would like to
analyse equity objectives independently of
distributional objectives that are motivated by
altruism. That there is so much talk of equity
4
 Mooney (1986), for example, asks whether one can rationalize the equity goals of the NHS in terms of altruism. To the
extent that the NHS's equity goab are genuinely about equity and social justice rather than altruism, the question would seem
somewhat misguided. Of course, it may be that what are passed off as equity objectives are really not equity objectives at all,
but rather are redistributional objectives reflecting altruism. It is not obvious, however, that it makes sense to assume that this
is the case ex hypothesis.
5
 This section draws heavily on Culyer (1980).
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objectives in the context of health care suggests
either that a separate analysis of equity is held to be
desirable, or that the distinction between altruism
and equity is not widely appreciated.
(ii) Social Justice and Concepts of Equity
There is another important but often overlooked
distinction in the literature, namely the distinction
between equity objectives that are couched in terms
of equality and those that are couched in terms of
minimum standards (Le Grand and Robinson, 1984,
p. 37).' Policies whose objectives are couched in
terms of equality aim at eliminating inequalities;
policies whose objectives are couched in temis of
minimum standards aim merely at ensuring that
nobody falls below some specified minimum level.
Equity goals couched in terms of equality may be
viewed as coming from a theory of social justice
built around the notion of distribution according to
need (Culyer, 1980, p. 62). This in turn is a key
component of 20th-century egalitariartism ( Sugden,
1983). Egalitarians view
access to health care [as] a citizen's right. . ., which
ought not to be influenced by income and wealth
(Maynard and Williams, 1984, p. 96).
Egalitarians emphasize fraternity—a sense of
brotherhood and collective citizenship between
people (Sugden, op. cit). They espouse an explicitly
collectivist philosophy of social justice and view
social unity as a good thing in its own right. This
egalitarian view suggests that an NHS-type state
sector should predominate in the health care sector,
with health care being rationed according to 'need'
(Maynard and Williams, op. ciL; Williams, 1988).
To an egalitarian an equitable health care financing
system is one in which payments for health care are
positively related to ability to pay: he would regard
it as right and proper that persons who are able to
pay more towards health care should do so. On the
delivery side this viewpoint gives rise to a set of
equity objectives that are couched in terms of
equality. One such goal is 'equal treatment for
equal need'; another is 'equality of access' (see
section III below). Both refer to equality rather than
to minimum standards (Goodin and Le Grand,
1987). All—or nearly all—inequalities are inequi-
table. An egalitarian would, for example, argue that
it is wholly wrong that, when two people are in equal
need of medical care.... one should receive more than
the other (Sugden, 1983, p. 37).
Sugden, in fact, goes further and argues that un-
equal treatment of persons in equal need would be
viewed as inequitable, even if the inequality arises
out of the free choice of the individuals concerned;
even if, for example, one of the persons had volun-
tarily chosen not to take out health insurance. Thus:
Once it is accepted that social unity is a good thing in its
own right, and a 'sense of separateness' is bad, it
becomes natural to say that people in like circum-
stances ought to consume the same combinations of
goods and services whether they would chose to do so
or not. (Sugden, 1983, p. 41)
This view is hotly disputed by Le Grand (19876),
who argues that, depending on circumstances, there
may be instances where equal treatment for equal
need would 'conflict with intuitive judgements'
(Le Grand, 1984, p. 44). He gives the example of a
drunk driver crashing his car and injuring himself
and a pedestrian in the process, and suggests that
equity would require giving the victim preference.
One cannot, Le Grand concludes,
simply observe inequality... and thereby judge, on the
basis of that inequality alone, whether or not an alloca-
tion is equitable or inequitable (Le Grand, 1984, p. 44;
emphasis in original).
Whether a true egalitarian would accept this or not
is, perhaps, a moot poinL In its emphasis on individual
circumstances and its suggestion that some
individuals are more deserving than others, Le
Grand's ideas would seem to run counter to the
egalitarian emphasis on fraternity and common
citizenship. An egalitarian might argue that there is
no space in his philosophy for what are essentially
individualistic 'intuitive judgements'.
A second set of equity goals is defined in terms of
minimum standards (Le Grand and Robinson, 1984).
Culyer (1980) suggests that an emphasis on minimum
6
 The distinction between equality and minimum standards is made in both the literature on caring and the literature on
equity and social justice (Culyer, 1980). The rationale for each could therefore be sought either in terms of altruism or in terms
of considerations of social justice. Here we focus on the latter.
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standards might be viewed as the outcome of a
Rawlsian conceptual experiment in which 'all would
come to the same conclusion behind the "veil of
ignorance" that certain minima . . . ought to be
guaranteed eachmemberof society' (Culyer, 1980,
p. 146). In the context of health care the emphasis
on minimum standards is particularly prevalent
amongst what Maynard and Williams (op. cit.) call
the 'libertarian' school. This regards access to
health care as part of society's reward system and
maintains that people should, at the margin at least,
'be permitted to use their income and wealth to gain
more or better health care (than their fellow citizens
in otherwise identical circumstances) if they so
desire' (Maynard and Williams, 1984, p. 96). This
reflects the fundamentally individualistic nature of
the libertarian viewpoint:
To anyone whose values are individualistic, it is natural
that social arrangements should reflect the diversity of
people's interests and preferences. That different people
should consume differentbundles of goods and services
is entirely right and proper. (Sugden, 1983, p. 41.)
The libertarian approach points, as Maynard and
Williams note, towards a mainly private health care
sector, with health care being rationed primarily
according to willingness and ability to pay. It
requires that state involvement be minimal and
limited to providing a minimum standard of care for
the poor.
According to this viewpoint, on the delivery side,
considerations of social justice require that every-
body be guaranteed a basic minimum level of
health care. On the finance side, there should be
income transfers from the non-poor to the poor, but
these should be in-kind transfers in the form of free
or subsidized health care. Nothing is indicated
about how the burden of financing the transfers
should be distributed across the non-poor.
(iii) Cross-Country Differences in Equity Goals
The differences between countries in their health
care systems probably reflect, at least to some
extent, the differences in the type of equity goals
pursued7 In the United States, equity goals tend to
be defined in terms of minimum standards rather
than in terms of equal treatment for equal need, or
equality of access.8 In several of the European
countries, by contrast, policy statements on equity
frequently have a distinctly egalitarian flavour (e.g.
British Ministry of Health, 1944).
The fact that not all countries subscribe to the same
equity goals means that a country's health care
system can be appraised in either of two ways
(Culyer etal., 1982). Oneway would be to appraise
it with reference to its own equity goals. This would
be the relevant assessment if one were interested in
answering the question: how successfiil is the country
in question in achieving its own equity objectives?
Alternatively, the country's system might be ap-
praised with reference to another country's equity
goals. This cross-cultural assessment would be
relevant if one were interested in answering the
question: does 'their' system do better than 'ours'?
III. HOW SHOULD EQUITY BE DEFINED?
In the previous section we considered what are
essentially concepts of equity. In this section we
look at the various definitions of equity that have
been proposed in the literature. In doing so we focus
exclusively on egalitarian goals and ignore com-
pletely minimum standards goals. We also con-
sider separately the finance of health care its deliv-
ery.
(i) Defining Equity in the Finance of Health
Care
Egalitarians typically define equity on the finance
side in terms of a requirement that payments for
health care be directly related to ability to pay. In
effect, this is a statement about vertical equity —the
requirement that unequals (defined here in terms of
7
 Such a conclusion may be unwarranted. As Maxwell (1981) notes, the mix between different sources of finance frequently
seems to depend more on history than on principle. It may well be wrong, in other words, to assume that a particular mix
represents the outcome of a deliberate and well-informed decision.
8
 Tobin (1970) is rather ambivalent about attitudes in the United States towards health care. He suggests that Americans
are concerned about inequality in access to medical care and that equality in health care might be taken to mean that 'the
treatment of an individual depends on his medical condition and symptoms, not on his ability or willingness to pay1. Later,
however, he notes that in practice the American health care system aims at bringing the medical care received by the poor up
to a minimum standard rather than at promoting equality of access.
93
OXFORD REVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICY, VOL. 5, NO. 1
'ability to pay*) be treated unequally.' As a defini-
tion it is rather vague. How is 'ability to pay' to be
measured? By pre-tax income? By pre-tax income
plus imputed income from physical assets such as
the individual's house? Should those with greater
ability to pay be paying more in proportional terms?
In other words, ought the relationship between
ability to pay and payments to be progressive?10 Or
should they merely be paying more in absolute
terms? In other words, can the relationship between
ability to pay and payments be proportional or even
regressive?11 If the relationship is to be progressive,
how progressive ought it to be? Typically policy
statements fail to address questions such as these. It
seems reasonable, however, to conclude that for an
egalitarian, payments for health care ought not to be
regressive and probably ought to be progressive.
The issue of horizontal equity on the finance side
(the requirement that equals be treated equally) is
rarely discussed by policy-makers and has received
little attention in the health economics literature.
The logic of the discussion above suggests that
horizontal equity might be defined in terms of the
extent to which those of equal ability to pay actually
end up making equal payments, regardless of, for
example, gender, marital status, trade union mem-
bership, place of residence, etc. Horizontal inequity
might arise for a number of reasons. In a tax-funded
system such as the British NHS it might arise
through anomalies in the personal income tax sys-
tem (e.g. tax reliefs such as mortgage interest tax
relief). In a private insurance system low-risk groups
(e.g. non-drinkers) may receive reduced premiums.
A strict egalitarian might well consider this inequi-
table.12 In a mixed system different occupational
groups may be eligible for different health insur-
ance schemes. Some examples of horizontal ineq-
uity in the Dutch health care financing system are
provided by Rutten and Janssen (1987): they find,
for example, that single persons on an income of
Dfl 17,000 in 1981 could end up paying as little as
2 per cent of their income towards health care if they
were over 65 but as much as 13 per cent if they were
under 65 but self-employed.
(ii) Defining Equity in the Delivery of Health
Care
Common to all egalitarian definitions of equity in
the delivery of health care is the emphasis on
equality. The various possible definitions have
been discussed by Le Grand (1982, 19876) and
Mooney (1983, 1986). The three most common
definitions are: (i) equal treatment for equal need,
(ii) equality of access, and (iii) equality of health.
Another definition that is implicit in some of the
empirical work is: (iv) equality of final incomes.
The idea here is that health care should be allocated
in a way that favours the poor, so that inequalities
in final incomes (i.e. income plus imputed benefits
from health care) are reduced."
There are various points that are worth noting
before considering the relevance of each of these
definitions. First, the concept of' access' is often ill-
defined in policy documents. Le Grand (1982)
suggests that it might best be interpreted in terms of
the time and money costs that individuals incur in
using health care facilities. As Mooney (1983)
emphasizes, this makes 'access' a supply-side
phenomenon and contrasts with 'treatment', which
is a function of both supply and demand: i.e. the
latter depends not only on the costs facing an
individual but also on his perception of the benefits
of health care. Second, definitions (ii) and (iii) both
view equity in terms of the attainment of equality
across the population as a whole, whilst the first
views equity in terms of the attainment of equality
amongst specific sub-groups in the population,
notably those in equal 'need' (Goodin and Le
Grand, 1987). In the context of the latter it is
important to note that the judgement about whether
a person is in 'need' is to be made not by the
9
 On the distinction between vertical and horizontal equity, see Cullis and West (1979) and West (1981).
10
 A finance system is progressive if the proportion of income paid out for health care rises as the level of income rises.
11
 A finance system is proportional if the proportion of income paid out for health care is the same at all income levels and
regressive if the proportion of income paid out falls as income rises.
12
 Le Grand (19876) would presumably argue otherwise. The argument would be that individuals who choose to drink,
knowing the risks involved to themselves and others (e.g. through drunk driving), should, on equity grounds, be called on to
pay towards the cost of any treatment they or others require as a result of their drinking.
13
 Mooney (1983) adds another definition, namely 'equal access for equal need'. This definition seems, in fact, to be at the
heart of the resource allocation formula of the English Resource Allocation Working Party (cf. British Department of Health
and Social Security, 1976).
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individual but by a third party (usually the physi-
cian) (Williams, 1978,1987). Third, all three defi-
nitions are difficult to operationalize. How should
treatment be measured? By utilization or by im-
puted resource costs? On what criteria is need to be
assessed? How should access be measured? How
far can one blame inequalities in health on the
health care system?
With definition (i) it is natural to go one step further
and make the distinction between horizontal equity
and vertical equity. As it stands definition (i) is a
statement only about horizontal equity: it says
nothing about how those in unequal need should be
treated Supplementing definition (I) with its vertical
equity counterpart is, in principle, important, because
horizontal equity does not guarantee vertical equity.
In practice, however, operationaliziag the concept
of vertical equity is hampered by some major
problems: these include determining what constitutes
unequal need, determining the degree of inequality
between those considered to be in different degrees
of need, and deciding what form the unequal treatment
of unequals should take (Le Grand, 1984; Mooney,
1986). With some exceptions (e.g. Cullis and West,
1979, pp. 237-39) the issue of vertical equity in the
delivery of health care rarely gets discussed in the
health economics literature.
hi applied work it is definitions (i), (iii), and (iv)
that are the most common. The extent to which the
British NHS has been successful in achieving equal
treatment for equal need has been analysed by Le
Grand (1978), Collins and Klein (1980.) and Hurst
(1985).14 Le Grand andRabin (1986) and nisley and
Le Grand (1987) present evidence on trends in
inequalities in health in Britain, while Le Grand
(1987a) compares inequalities in health in Britain
with inequalities in health elsewhere. The British
Central Statistical Office (CSO) regularly presents
analyses of the extent to which the NHS and other
parts of the Welfare State redistribute income (e.g.
CSO, 1987). Income redistribution studies in the
field of health care are more popular, though, in the
German-speaking countries: Leu and Frey (1985),
for example, present the results of a budget incidence
study assessing the extent to which the Swiss health
care system as a whole results in income
redistribution.
Mooney and McGuire (1987) have examined vari-
ous policy statements in Britain and conclude that
the equity objectives of the NHS are best captured
by definitions (i) and (ii). Mooney and McGuire
note that, despite the extensive interest in inequalities
in health in Britain (e.g. British Department of
Health and Social Security, 1980), there is no
evidence whatsoever that equality of health is, or
ever has been, an objective of government policy.
The same might be said of countries such as Italy:
though the Italian National Health Service Act talks
about the protection of health, there is no indication
that equality of health is a policy goal (Italian
Ministry of Justice, 1978). Nor, it might be added,
is there any evidence that the equity goals of Britain
and Italy are couched in terms of income
redistribution. This suggests that budget incidence
studies such as that of Leu and Frey (op. ciL) are of
little relevance in the health care sector. It also casts
doubt on the assertion of Lambert and PfShler
(1988) to the effect that ' . . . equitable... distributions
of . . . expenditure benefits are not the ultimate
objective of government policy; they are rather
employed as means to achieve desired distributional
equity of postfisc income' (p. 179).
None of this is to say, of course, that the adoption
by governments of definitions (i) and (ii) is sensible
or consistent Several authors have, indeed, sug-
gested otherwise (e.g. Le Grand, 19876; Mooney,
1987; Culyer, this issue). It may well be that one
day governments will respond to these criticisms
by redefining their equity objectives in health care.
If this happens, researchers will clearly need to
devise new methods for monitoring the success of
health care systems in achieving equity objectives.
In the meantime, in the absence of consensus and
new methods, it would seem to make sense to
continue with the existing definitions.
IV. HOW SHOULD EQUITY BE
MEASURED?
In order to be able to perform international com-
parisons it is clearly necessary to have some means
of measuring equity. In the remainder of the paper
we discuss ways in which this might be done,
focusing on specific aspects and definitions. On the
14
 Collins and Klein (1980) claim to examine access. Their measure of access is whether or not the person in question
contacted a primary care physician, which is clearly a measure of utilization rather than access.
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finance side we look only at vertical equity and
ignore the issue of horizontal equity. On the deliv-
ery side we focus on the definition of equal treat-
ment for equal need but ignore its vertical equity
counterpart.
(i) Measuring Equity in the Finance of Health
Care
In the absence of a clear statement on the desired
relationship between ability to pay and payments,
the obvious strategy to adopt in analysing vertical
equity on the finance side is simply to describe the
current relationship. Hurst (1985) does this in his
comparison of the distribution of payments in Britain,
Canada, and the United States: he presents tables
indicating estimates of the average payment in each
income group for each country and compares average
payments with average incomes in the bottom and
top income groups. He finds that the health care
financing system is regressive in the USA, but
progressive in Britain and Canada. Thus, for example,
in Britain 'household income rises about 4.5 times
between the second and ninth deciles whereas
household tax contributions rose about seven-fold
over this range* (Hurst, 1985, p. 117).
A similar approach was adopted by Gottschalk et
al. (1986) in their comparison of the health care
financing systems of the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom, and the United States in 1981. They
compare the percentage of (post-tax) income received
by each decile with the percentage of total health
care payments it bears. Figure 1 presents their
results for the American system. Again, the results
imply that the financing system in the United States
is regressive. Thus, for example, the bottom income
decile received 1.4 per cent of post-tax income but
made 3.9 per cent of health care payments. The
Dutch system is found to be roughly proportional
and the British system progressive.
Tabulation of average incomes and health care
payments by income group does not in itself enable
one to answer the question of how much more (or
less) progressive one system is than another. At
best it can indicate whether a system is progressive,
regressive, or proportional. A way round this prob-
lem is to employ progressivity indices. A variety of
indices have been proposed in the literature on tax
progressivity (e.g. Lambert, 1985) and these might
be used to perform cross-country comparisons of
the progressivity of health care financing systems.
Fig 1: Health care financing In U.S.
35%.
Relative shares of Income deciles
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One popular index is the index proposed by Kakwani
(1977). Kakwani's index is based on the extent to
which a tax system departs from proportionality
and can best be illustrated using Figure 2.15 The
curve labelled g4* gives the Lorenz curve for pre-tax
income." The second curve—labelled g"—gives
the tax concentration curve, which plots the
cumulative proportions of the population (ranked
according to pre-tax income as with g"*) against the
proportions of total tax payments. If taxes are levied
strictly in proportion to income, the tax concentration
curve and the Lorenz curve for pre-tax income
would coincide. If the average tax rate rises with
income (so that the tax system is progressive), the
tax concentration curve lies outside the Lorenz
curve for pre-tax income. The opposite is true if
taxes are regressive. The degree of progressivity
might therefore be assessed by looking at the size of
the area between g°° and g"". If O" is the Gini
coefficient for pre-tax income17 and O is the
concentration index for tax payments, Kakwani's
index of progressivity, PK, is defined as
(1)PK =
which is twice the area between g" and g"*. If the
system is regressive so that g" lies above g*10, PK is
negative. The lowest value PK can take is -2.0. This
occurs when all pre-tax income is concentrated in
the hands of the richest person (so that the Lorenz
curve is J -shaped) and the entire tax burden falls
on the poorest person (so that the tax concentration
Fig 2: Measurement of tax progressivity
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13
 Not all indices of progressivity are based on the extent to which the tax system departs from proportionality. Somo—such
as that of Reynolds and Smolensky (1977)—are based on the rcdistributive effect of taxation (cf. Lambert, 1985).
16
 The Lorenz curve plots cumulative proportions of the population (from the poorest to the richest) against the proportions
of total income they receive. If incomes are distributed equally the Lorenz curve and the diagonal coincide. Otherwise it will
be a bowed-out line as in Rgure 2: thus, for example, the bottom 20 per cent of the population receive less than 20 per cent
of the community's total income.
17
 The Gini coefficient is the ellipse-shaped area between the Lorenz curve as a proportion of the total area under the diagonal.
It is therefore equal to one minus the area under the Lorenz curve and ranges from 0 (when there is complete equality and the
Lorenz curve coincides with the diagonal) to 1 (when all income is concentrated in the hands of one person and the Lorenz
curve is J-shaped). The concentration index is defined in exactly the same way except that the concentration curve is used
instead of the Lorenz curve.
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curve is F -shaped). The highest value PK can take
is 1.0. Tins occurs when pre-tax income is distrib-
uted equally (so that the Lorenz curve coincides
with the diagonal) and the entire tax burden falls on
the richest person (so that the tax concentration
curve is J -shaped).
(ii) Measuring Equity in the Delivery of Health
. Care
Under the definition given above (horizontal) equity
in the delivery of health care requires that persons
of equal need actually end up receiving equal
treatment, irrespective of personal characteristics
that are irrelevant to real need. The key 'third*
variables here tend to be 'ability to pay', race,
gender, and place of residence. We focus here on
ability to pay.
In the British empirical literature 'ability to pay' is
proxied either by income or by socio-economic
status. 'Need' is proxied by self-reported health
status and 'treatment' is measured either by utilization
(e.g. whether the individual had seen a general
practitioner in the previous two weeks) or by imputed
expenditure. The extent of inequity is then determined
by comparing the distributions of need and treatment
across income deciles or socioeconomic groups
(SEGs).
Figure 3 presents the results for Le Grand's (1978)
analysis of the 1972 General Household Survey
data. The first pair of bars indicate that whilst 32 per
cent of the 'ill' are to be found in SEGs V and VI
(semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers), these
SEGs together receive only 27 per cent of total ex-
penditure. The final pair of bars indicates that
whilst only 14 per cent of the 'ill' are to be found in
SEGs I and II (professional, employers and manag-
ers), these two groups receive 17 per cent of total
expenditure. By 'ill' is meant persons reporting
either acute sickness or limiting long-standing ill-
ness. Expenditure comprises the imputed resource
costs of utilization of primary care facilities and
hospital in-patient and out-patient facilities. Note
that the gap narrows as one moves from the first to
Fig 3: Distribution of health care
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Fig 4: Distribution of health care
England and Wales, 1976
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the second pair of bars and widens as one moves
from the third to the fourth pair of bars. The
implication of Figure 3 is that whilst the lower
SEGs received a higher proportion of public expen-
diture on health care than the higher SEGs, their
share was less than their share of reported sickness.
Hurst (1985) has undertaken a similar analysis
using the 1976 General Household Survey but
based on income deciles. His results appear in
Figure 4.18 From the third decile upwards the
results are similar to those of Le Grand.
Le Grand (1982) concludes from his results that the
NHS has failed to achieve equal treatment forequal
need (Le Grand, 1982, p. 46). The argument is
straightforward. Assume that all persons reporting
ill are in equal need and that only persons who are
ill receive health care. Then if horizontal equity is
achieved—so that those in equal need receive the
same amount of public expenditure—the share of
NHS expenditure going to each SEG will be pro-
portional to its share of persons reporting ill. If, as
seems to be the case, the share of NHS expenditure
received by the lower SEGs is less than their share
of persons reporting ill, it must be concluded that
the sick in the lower SEGs receive less NHS expen-
diture than the sick in the higher SEGs. Equals are
not being treated equally and—contrary to the aims
of the founding fathers of the NHS—this inequity is
apparently related to income.
As already mentioned, this argument assumes that
all persons who are classified as ill are in equal need
and that those who are not classified as ill do not
make any use of the health service. As Puffer (1986)
notes, if a person is classified as ill if he reports
chronic or acute conditions (as in Le Grand's analy-
sis but not in Hurst's), the first assumption is clearly
unwarranted: the two groups are most unlikely to be
regarded as requiring the same amounts of health
care resources. In this case the argument above
concerning horizontal equity breaks down. Trying
to get round this problem by classifying people as
ill if they are, say, chronically sick (as Hurst does)
exacerbates the second problem: the fewer people
one classifies as ill, the more people one leaves as
non-sick and the less likely it is that the distribution
of expenditure reflects what is received by those
11
 Expenditure figures arc derived from Hurst's fig. 7.4 and are therefore subject to some error.
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classified as ill. A way round both problems would
be to break the sample down into groups with
similar needs and then analyse for each sub-sample
the distributions of illness and expenditure. The
expenditure shares here would be the shares not of
the total expenditure received by the sample but of
the total expenditure received by the group in
question. This approach has been used by Collins
and Klein (1980) and O'Donnell (1987). Though it
is hoped to make some use of this alternative
approach in future work, the present paper sticks to
Le Grand's original approach.
Bearing these shortcomings in mind we turn now to
the problem of measuring inequity. As they stand,
Figures 3 and 4 do not enable one to perform com-
parisons of the degree of equity of different delivery
systems. At best they can show whether inequity
exists. The discussion does, however, suggest a
method for performing such comparisons. Le Grand's
strategy involves determining whether the shares of
expenditure received by the various SEGs (or in-
come deciles) are proportional to their share of total
ill-health: inequity favouring the rich results in the
higher SEGs receiving more than their 'fair' share
and the lower SEGs receiving less than their 'fair'
share.
The extent of such inequity might be measured as
follows. First, rank individuals according to their
'ability to pay', beginning with the poorest. Then
construct an illness concentration curve: this is the
curve labelled g° in Figure 5 and plots the cumula-
tive proportions of the population against the pro-
portions of total ill-health. Note that because illness
is concentrated amongst the lower income groups,
the illness concentration curve lies above the diago-
nal: thus in Figure 5 persons in the bottom 40 per
cent of the income distribution account for more
than 40 per cent of all persons reporting ill health.
It is important to appreciate that in constructing the
curve labelled g"1 persons are ranked by their in-
come. This distinguishes our concentration curve
from the Lorenz curve used by inter alia nisley and
Le Grand (1987): in this latter approach persons are
ranked by their health rather than by their income.
It is perhaps worth noting that the concentration
curve would seem to be more suited to measuring
inequalities in health than the Lorenz curve. The
latter is open to the objection that it measures
inequalities per se rather than inequalities associ-
ated with income—a shortcoming acknowledged
by nisley and Le Grand (1987, p. 33). The same
criticism cannot, of course, be levelled at the con-
centration curve.
Fig 5: Horiz. inequity in health care
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Next plot an expenditure concentration curve: this
is the curve labelled g""" in Figure 5 and plots the
cumulative proportions of the population against
the proportions of total expenditure received.1' Note
that in so far as the lower income groups are more
intensive users of health services than the higher
income groups (as is the case in Britain), the expen-
diture concentration curve lies above the diagonal.
Comparison of the two concentration curves pro-
vides an indication of the extent of inequity. If
health care expenditures are allocated across in-
come groups in proportion to their share of total ill-
health, the two concentration curves would coin-
cide. If those in lower income groups receive less
than their 'fair' share and those in higher income
groups receive more than their 'fair' share, the
expenditure concentration curve will lie below the
illness concentration curve.20 The extent of inequity
might therefore be assessed by looking at the size of
the area between the two concentration curves.
Following the logic of Kakwani's tax progressivity
index, one might measure the extent of inequity as
twice the area between the two curves. If C is the
concentration coefficient for illness and O* is the
concentration index for expenditures, twice the
area between the two concentration curves is equal
to21
(2) - C*
The HI"1 index is positive if there is horizontal
inequity favouring the rich and negative if there is
horizontal inequity favouring the poor.22
V. SOME ILLUSTRATIVE
CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS
In this section we present some empirical illustrations
of the equity measures proposed in the previous
section.
(i) Equity in the Finance of Health Care
Most countries finance the bulk of their health care
expenditures from one or more of four sources: (i)
taxation, (ii) social insurance contributions, (iii)
out-of-pocket payments, and (iv) private insurance
premiums. The mix of sources varies considerably
from one country to the next (Maynard, 1975;
Maxwell, 1981; Abel Smith, 1984). Some idea of
this variation can be gleaned from Table 1, though
the data are rather old.
The United States stands out as the only country
relying on out-of-pocket payments and private
insurance premiums for the majority of its revenues:
in 1975 these two sources together accounted for 57
per cent of total expenditures. In Europe the picture
is markedly different, with taxation and social
insurance contributions together typically accounting
for around three-quarters of health care expenditures:
the average for the European countries listed in
Table 1 is 80 per cent. The relative importance of
taxation and social insurance in Europe varies,
however, from country to country. The Nordic
countries, Britain, Ireland, and Portugal all rely
heavily on taxation: in Britain, for example, social
insurance contributions account for only about 5
per cent of health care revenues, whilst in Portugal
the role of social insurance contributions was reduced
over the period 1974-8 and was finally abolished in
1978 (Abel Smith, 1984, p. 113). The other European
countries all rely heavily on (compulsory) social
insurance contributions: this includes countries such
as Germany and the Netherlands where contributions
are paid to sickness funds, as well as countries such
as Italy and Spain where contributions are paid to
central government.
The distinction between the different sources of
finance is important, because the distribution of
contributions across income groups tends to vary
19
 Morris and Preston (1986) use an expenditure concentration curve for social security benefits.
20
 The opposite will o f course be true if the poor receive more than their fair share and the rich receive less than their fair
share.
21
 Note that the concentration indices are negative if the concentration curves l ie above the diagonal.
22
 It might be argued that whether inequity favours the rich or the poor is immateriaL If this is the v i ew taken and the
concentration curves do not cross, HI"1 might be defined instead as twice the absolute value of the difference between C"9
and C . If, however, the concentration curves cross (as, for example , in the case of Hurst's results), the formula foT H I 1 0 in
eq (2) would be invalid.
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Table 1
Health care expenditures by source of finance, 1975
Country General Social Direct Private
tax insurance payment insurance
Australia
Canada
France
W Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Sweden
Switzerland
UK
USA
62.7
66.3
7.0
14.6
23.8
15.1
78.5
41.7
87.3
31.0
1.7
9.1
69.0
62.5
67.5
56.0
13.1
24.8
5.0
11.7
21.1
19.5
19.6
12.5
8.7
27.3
8.4
33.5
5.8
27.1
13.8
2.5
3.0
5.3
-
-
0.0
-
1.2
25.6
Source: Maxwell (1981), table 4-1.
Note: Figures for direct payment for Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland include insurance premiums.
from one source to another. As Maxwell (1981)
notes, social insurance systems tend to be less
progressive than tax-financed systems. The precise
degree of progressivity depends, however, on the
details of the scheme. The tax-financed systems
operating in the Scandinavian countries, for example,
rely heavily on local income tax (which tends to be
proportional rather than progressive), whilst the
British tax-financed NHS draws its funds from
general tax revenues (which, on conventional
assumptions about the incidence of indirect taxes,
tend to be mildly progressive). The estimated
progressivity of the social insurance schemes will
depend inter alia on the split between employee
and employer contributions, the assumptions one
makes about who bears the employer contribution
and on the progressivity of the two sets of contribution
schedules.
Our empirical analysis in this section covers three
countries: the United States, Britain, and the
Netherlands. We selected these countries partly
because the necessary data were readily available in
tabulated form. We begin with the case of the
United States. This offers an interesting polar case,
because of the importance of private health insurance
and out-of-pocket payments. Of the ten countries
listed in Table 1 the United States raised
proportionally more revenue through private
insurance premiums and out-of-pocket payments
than any other. Public involvement in health care is
limited and is mainly directed at the two programmes,
Medicaid and Medicare.23 The former is financed
out of federal and state general tax revenues, whilst
the latter is financed out of general tax revenues,
payroll taxes, premiums, and direct payments.
Table 2, which is based on Gottschalk et al (1986),
indicates inter alia the proportion of total expenditures
from each source of finance borne by each income
decile in 1981.*4 The first column indicates each
decile's share of total pre-tax income. Columns 2-5
indicate the proportions of total payments borne by
each decile: thus the first row of the table indicates
23
 Medicaid covers certain groups on low incomes. Medicare covers persons over 65, persons on renal dialysis, and the
permanently disabled. There are other subsidy programmes (for example, for war veterans), but these are much smaller. There
are also 'tax expenditures' in the form of exemptions for certain categories of private expenditure: health insurance is often
a fringe benefit which is exempt from taxation and co-payments and co-insurance (above a certain minimum) are also tax-
deductible. See Gottschalk et al .(1986) for details.
M
 It would seem from the description of the financing system in Gottschalk et al. (1986) that column 2 ought to be general
taxation rather than income taxation. Because indirect taxes tend to be less progressive than income tax (indirect taxes are, in
fact, often regressive), the progressivity of the financing system will be overstated.
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Table 2
Distribution of Health Care Payments in the US, 1981
Decile
Bottom
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
Top
% total
revenue
Gini/Conc
Kakwani
(1)
Income
Pretax
income
1.3
2.8
4.2
5.5
7.0
8.4
9.9
12.0
15.1
33.8
0.43
(2)
Income
tax
0.2
0.8
2.0
3.0
4.9
6.5
8.7
12.1
17.4
44.5
23.6
0.58
0.15
(3) (4) (5)
Health Care Payments
Payroll
tax
0.6
1.5
3.7
6.1
8.9
10.7
12.6
14.7
18.1
23.0
15.2
0.39
-0.04
Direct
payments
8.9
10.3
8.8
9.6
9.5
9.2
9.3
10.7
11.7
11.9
32.8
0.04
-0.39
Insurance
premiums
2.6
4.1
6.0
8.0
10.3
12.2
13.4
14.9
14.9
13.6
28.4
0.23
-0.19
(6)
Total
payments
3.9
4.9
5.5
7.0
8.6
9.7
10.9
12.8
15.0
21.7
0.28
-0.15
Sources: Column 1: Pechman (1985) table 4-6; Columns 2-6: Gottschalk et al. (1986), table 3.
that the bottom income decile contributed a total of
0.20 per cent of income tax revenues, 0.61 per cent
of payroll tax revenues, 8.91 per cent of revenues
from direct payments and 2.61 per cent of revenues
from insurance premiums. In the case of employer
contributions to social insurance premiums (i.e.
payroll taxes) and private insurance premiums it
has been assumed that the burden is borne entirely
by the employee in the form of lower wages. Also
indicated in the table are the Gini coefficient for
pre-tax income, the concentration coefficients for
health care payments and the values of the Kakwani
progressivity index." The latter indicate that the
income tax is progressive but that the other means
of raising revenue are all regressive: out-of-pocket
payments are particularly regressive. The overall
result is a regressive health care financing system.
This is reflected in the fact that the payment
concentration curve lies inside the Lorenz curve for
pre-tax income (see Figure 6 below).
In Britain, despite the growth of the private sector
in the late 1970s, the NHS still accounts for well
over 90% of health care expenditure. As indicated
in table 1, almost 90% of its revenues are derived
from general taxation and only a small proportion
from social insurance contributions. Out-of-pocket
payments account only about 5% of NHS expendi-
tures.
Table 3, which is also based on Gottschalk et'al.
(1986), indicates inter alia the proportion of each
23
 Throughout the paper the Gini coefficients and concentration indices are computed from the grouped data in the tables and
are obtained by building up Lorenz and concentration curves using line segments (cf. e.g Fuller and Lury, 1977). This approach
in effect assumes that there is no inequality within each income range and therefore pro.vides only the lower limit of the index
in question (cf. e.g. Kakwani and Podder, 1976, p. 145).
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Fig 6: Finance of health care in U.S.A.
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source of finance for the NHS borne by each income
decile in 1981. The first column indicates each
decile's share of total pre-tax income.5* The
assumptions underlying the incidence of taxes are
those employed by CSO (see e.g. CSO, 1987). As
in the case of the United States, the burden of
employer contributions to social insurance premiums
(i.e. employer National Insurance contributions)
has been assumed to fall entirely on the employee.
Following Gottschalk et al., the total payments
column is based on a weighted average of columns
2 and 3, where the weights are equal to 0.9 and 0.1
respectively. Also indicated in the table are the Gini
coefficient for pre-tax income, the concentration
coefficients for health care payments and the v alues
of the Kakwani progressivity index. The latter
indicate that taxation is mildly progressive and that
the National Insurance system is also mildly
progressive. The overall result for the NHS is a
progressive health care financing system. This is
reflected in the fact that the payment concentration
curve lies outside the Lorenz curve for pre-tax
income (see Figure 7 below).
Health care in the Netherlands is financed mainly
out of social and private insurance contributions,
and direct payments. Only 6 per cent is financed out
of general taxation. Social insurance contributions
are of two types. The first type of contribution—the
AWBZ contribution—is compulsory for all persons
below pensionable age and covers expenses incurred
in respect of' catastrophic illness' (illness requiring
long-term institutional care), out-patient mental
care, and home nursing. AWBZ contributions are a
fixed proportion of 'premium income', up to a
ceiling and are paid by the employer. The second
type of social insurance contribution is paid to sick
funds to cover short-term care. These contributions
are compulsory only for those with an income
below a certain level. Prior to 1986, non-wage
earners with an income below a certain level could
contribute to a sick fund on a voluntary basis. Sick
fund contributions are proportional to gross income
up to a ceiling and are paid by employee and
employer. Private insurance premiums are not
income-related, but are instead often risk-related
(for example, according to age). Persons with private
24
 Households are ranked by pre-tax income in all columns in table 3.
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Table 3
Distribution of Health Care Payments in the UK, 1981
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income Health Care Payments
Decile
Bottom
2nd
3rd
4th
5 th
6th
7th
8th
9th
Top
% total revenue
Gini/Conc
Kakwani
Pre-tax
income
2.3
3.4
4.7
6.4
8.0
9.5
11.2
13.4
16.2
24.9
0.35
Tax
revenues
1.7
2.6
4.1
6.2
7.9
9.7
11.4
13.4
17.0
25.9
90.0
0.38
0.02
Social
insurance
1.3
1.9
3.4
6.3
8.5
10.6
12.5
14.8
17.6
23.0
10.0
0.38
0.03
Total
payment*
1.7
2.5
4.0
6.2
7.9
9.8
11.5
13.5
17.1
25.6
0.38
0.03
Sources: Columns 1-3: CSO (1982), table 7; Column 4: 90 per cent from col. 2,10 per cent from col.
3.
Fig 7: Health care finance in U.K.
100%
Lorenz and concentration curves
c
4>
| ^
O
o.
in
co
m
e 
A
'o
90%-
80%-
70%-
60%-
50%-
40%-
30%-
20%-
10%-
0 % 20% 40% 60%
% of population
+ CLJnc © fl_Pay
8 0 % 100">
105
OXFORD REVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICY, VOL. 5, NO. 1
insurance can often elect to be covered only for
certain types of care and/or to bear some fixed
amount of treatment costs via deductibles.
Table 4, which is based on tables from the Household
Expenditure Survey of the Dutch Central Bureau of
Statistics (CBS), indicates inter alia the proportion
of total expenditures from each source of finance
borne by each income decile in 1984.* Unfortunately
we have been unable to break down insurance
premiums (column 2) into sick fund contributions
and private insurance premiums. It should also be
noted that the estimates of the AWBZ contributions
in Table 4 are very approximate.*1 Itis evident from
the bottom line of the table that the two biggest
components of the health care financing system
(the sick fund contributions and the private insurance
premiums) are both regressive. Interestingly the
direct payments component of the financing system
is quite progressive: this presumably reflects the
fact that persons in high-income groups relying on
private insurance often elect to cover themselves
only partially and/or to reduce their premiums by
accepting deductibles. The overall effect, however,
is a regressive health care financing system. This
means that in the case of the Netherlands, as for the
United States, the payment concentration curve lies
inside the Lorenz curve for pre-tax income. A
Table 4
Distribution of Health Care Payments in the Netherlands, 1984
Income
decile
Bottom
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
Top
% total revenue
Gini/Conc
Kakwani
(1)
Income
Pre-tax
income
3.3
4.9
6.2
7.3
8.3
9.3
10.7
12.3
14.9
22.7
0.29
(2)
Insurance
premiums
3.8
6.0
8.0
9.0
9.6
10.8
11.4
11.9
14.2
15.3
75.8
0.19
-0.10
(3)
Health Care
AWBZ
premiums
1.5
3.7
5.9
7.9
9.5
10.8
12.3
14.2
16.0
18.1
31.2
0.29
0.00
(4)
Payments
Direct
payments
1.8
2.4
4.3
3.2
7.0
7.8
12.5
18.6
18.8
23.5
3.7
0.41
0.12
(5)
Total
payments
3.0
5.1
7.2
8.5
9.5
10.7
11.7
12.8
14.9
16.5
0.23
-0.06
Source: All except AWBZ premiums from Household Expenditure Survey, 1984. AWBZ premiums
from CBS Personal Income Distribution in 1983: Households.
Notes: 1. Premiums include Sick Fund and private health insurance premiums.
2. AWBZ premiums: compulsory social insurance against catastrophic illness.
37
 Gottschalk et at. (1986), in their analysis of the Dutch financing system, use tables from the Health Interview Survey. We
prefer the Household Expenditure Survey for three reasons: (i) it contains more reliable estimates of health care expenditures
(direct payments, and sick fund and private insurance premiums combined); (ii) it indicates average gross income for each of
decile of net income, whereas tables from the Health Interview Survey only indicate net income; (iii) the Household
Expenditure Survey does not treat all persons over 18 as a separate household, so that one does not run into the problem that
the bottom decile (which includes a lot of student 'households') receives only a tiny proportion of income (c.f. fn. to table 7
of Gottschalk et al., 1986).
M
 The published tables of the Household Expenditure Survey do not allow one to separate the sick fund contributions from
the AWBZ contributions. The AWBZ data in the table were estimated especially for us by the Department of Income Statistics
of CBS.
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comparison of the Kakwani indices in Tables 2 and
4 reveals, however, that the American financing
system is more regressive than the Dutch.
(ii) Equity in the Delivery of Health Care
As is evident from the results of the previous
section, the overall progressivity of any health care
financing system depends on the mix of sources of
finance and the rules relating contributions to in-
come. On the delivery side the degree of inequity
depends on the extent to which a person's income
(or ability to pay) influences the probability of his
seeking care when ill and the amount of care he
receives once the initial contact has been made. The
influence of income is likely to be greater the larger
are the various pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs
individuals incur in utilizing medical care. Ex-
amples include insurance premiums, out-of-pocket
payments, transport costs, and the opportunity cost
of time spent travelling and waiting (Le Grand,
1982). Since these costs will tend to vary from one
delivery system to the next, one would expect the
degree of inequity to vary accordingly.
In this section we present some evidence on the
extent of inequity in the delivery of health care in
three countries: Italy, the Netherlands, and Britain.
Again, our choice of countries was influenced by
considerations of data availability. We begin with
Britain.
Table 5, which is based on the data of Hurst (1985),
indicates inter alia the distributions of illness and
public expenditure on health care across income
deciles. The data were derived from the 1976
General Household Survey, conducted by CSO.
Income here is the gross income of the person's
household. Individuals are classified as ill if they
report limiting long-standing (i.e. chronic) sick-
ness. The expenditure figure is derived from infor-
mation on (i) the number of general practitioner
consultations, (ii) the number of days in hospital,
and (iii) the number of visits to hospital as an out-
patient. Each category of utilization is weighted by
its unit cost
The first row of table 5 indicates that 12.3 percent
of persons reporting limiting long-standing illness
are to be found in the bottom income decile, but the
bottom income decile receives as much as 18.2 per
cent of public expenditure on health care. The
second row indicates that 18.0 per cent of persons
reporting limiting long-standing illness are to be
found in the second income decile, but that this
decile receives only 15.8 per cent of public
expenditure on health care. The table also indicates
the values of the concentration indices for illness
and expenditure, as well as the index of horizontal
equity (cf. equation (2) above). The concentration
index for illness is negative indicating that persons
in the lower income groups tend to be in poorer
health than persons in the higher income groups.
The concentration index for expenditure is also
negative indicating that persons in the lower income
groups tend to receive more health care than persons
in the higher income groups. The index of inequity,
Table 5
Distribution of Health Care Expenditure
inEngland and Wales 1976
Income
decile
Bottom
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
Top
Cone ind
HI
% persons
chronic
illness
12.3
18.0
16.8
12.0
8.9
7.0
6.6
6.5
6.4
5.6
-0.212
0.014
%of
expenditure
18.2
15.8
13.3
10.4
7.8
6.6
6.2
6.2
7.8
7.8
-0.198
Source: Hurst (1985)
however, is positive indicating that, on average, the
expenditure concentration curve lies inside the
illness concentration curve. The NHS is thus
associated with horizontal inequity favouring the
rich.
Table 6 presents similar data for the Netherlands.
The data were derived from the Health Interview
Survey, conducted by CBS. Income here is the net
income of the individual's household. Two alternative
health indicators were used: (i) the presence or
absence of chronic conditions, and (ii) whether the
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Table 6
Distribution of Health Care Expenditure in the Netherlands, 1981-5
Income
range
(DflOOO)
-18
18-22
22-28
28-36
36-^5
45+
Conc index
HI
%of
population
17.7
14.7
21.5
18.2
14.2
13.7
%of
expenditure
27.7
18.6
18.7
15.4
9.3
10.3
-0.163
% persons
chronic
illness
22.4
17.4
21.5
15.8
11.8
11.0
-0.095
-0.068
% persons
health
not good
27.3
20.2
21.9
14.0
8.9
7.7
-0.201
0.038
Source: Based on tabulations from Health Interview Survey 1981-1985
person viewed his health as being 'not so good'
(minder goed). The expenditure figure is derived
from information on (i) the number of general
practitioner consultations, (n) the number of specialist
consultations, and (iii) the number of days in hospital.
Again, each category is weighted by its unit cosL
The concentration index for chronic illness is nega-
tive as in Britain, indicating that inequalities in
health exist in the Netherlands as well as in Britain.
The absolute value of the index is, however, much
smaller in the case of the Netherlands. Interpreted
literally this means that there is less inequality in
health in the Netherlands than in Britain. The
bottom line of Table 6 indicates that though the
index of horizontal inequity is positive in the case
of the 'health not good' indicator, it is negative in
the case of the chronic conditions indicator. Since
it is the latter that comes closest to the indicator
used by Hurst, the implication is that whilst the
delivery of health care in Britain is associated with
inequity favouring the rich, the delivery of health
care in the Netherlands is associated with inequity
favouring the poor. Thus in the case of the Nether-
lands the expenditure concentration curve lies above
the concentration curve for chronic illness (see
Figure 8).
Table 7 presents the distributions of illness and
health care expenditure for Italy. The data were
derived from the 1985 Health Care Consumption
Survey, conducted by the Centra Europa Ricerche.
Income here is the gross income of the respondent's
family. As in the case of the Netherlands we use two
alternative health indicators: (i) the presence or
absence of chronic conditions, and (ii) whether the
person viewed his health as being 'not good' (non
buono). The expenditure figure is derived from
information on (i) the number of physician consul-
tations (general practitioners and specialists), and
(ii) the number of spells in hospital.29 Again both
categories were weighted by their unit costs.10
From the last-but-one line in Table 7 it is evident
that inequalities in health between rich and poor
exist in Italy as in our other two countries. However,
comparing Tables 5,6, and 7 reveals that inequalities
in chronic ill-health seem to be less pronounced in
29
 Later w e hope to produce more precise estimates o f expenditure per person by distinguishing between visits to general
practitioners and visits to special ists , and by using information on length of stay per hospital spelL
30
 For physician visits w e have used a weighted average of the cost per GP visit and the cost per specialist visit, where the
weights are the share of each type of visit in the total number of physician visits. Both costs are based on public sector costs.
Our figure for cost per visit was Lire 31,077 (1985 prices). For hospitals w e have used the cost per case for those private
hospitals providing services to the state on a contractural basis (pspedali comeniionati): apparently it is impossible with the
existing data col lect ion system to compute cost per case for Italian state-owned hospitals. Our figure for cost per case was Lire
4 , 0 0 1 3 7 5 (1985 prices) . Detai ls of the calculations are available from the authors on request
108
A. Wagstatf, E. van Doorslaer, and P. Paci
Fig
100%
8: Illness and expend, cone, curves
The Netherlands, 1085
0% 20% 40% 60%
% of population
o gj l l A g_exp
80% 10CW
Table 7
Distribution of Health Care Expenditure in Italy, 1985
Income
range
(Lirera.)
-12
12-18
18-25
25-50
50+
Conc index
HI
%of
population
18.1
15.4
21.8
23.3
21.4
%of
expenditure
23.1
13.6
22.3
20.1
20.9
-0.047
% persons
chronic
illness
22.6
16.0
19.1
22.6
19.8
-0.052
0.005
% persons
health
not good
31.3
15.6
19.0
17.9
16.2
-0.165
0.118
Source: Based on data fmmHealth Care Consumption Survey conducted by Centra Europa Ricerche
1985.
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Italy than they are in both Britain and the Netherlands.
The ranking of Italy and the Netheiiands is unchanged
if the 'health not good' indicator is used instead.
The indices of inequity provide a rather different
picture. The index is positive for Italy for both
health indicators, though in the case of the chronic
illness indicator the index is close to zero and is
substantially smaller than that of Britain. Thus
though there is apparently some inequity favouring
the rich, the degree of inequity is small both in
absolute terms and relative to the degree of inequity
present in Britain. It is worth noting that the indices
of inequity in Tables 6 and 7 present a fairly
consistent picture: the two indices for Italy are both
larger than their Dutch counterparts (suggesting
greater inequity in Italy than in the Netherlands),
and the 'not good health' indicator presents a less
favourable picture in both countries.
VI. DISCUSSION
Before summarizing and discussing what we have
done, it may be worth pointing out what we have
not done. First, we have looked only at egalitarian
definitions of equity: we have said nothing about
minimum standards definitions. For countries which
do not aspire to egalitarian goals (such as the United
States), this is an important omission. Second, in
the measurement part of the paper we have looked
only at vertical equity on the finance side: the issue
of how to measure horizontal equity on the finance
side was not discussed. Finally, in the measurement
part of the paper we have looked only at one
definition of (horizontal) equity on the delivery
side: we have not discussed how, for example, the
concept of equality of access might be operationalized
Our results may be summarized as follows. Of the
three countries whose financing systems we
examined—the Netherlands, Britain, and the United
States—two were found to have regressive financing
systems (the Netherlands and the United States)
and one a mildly progressive financing system
(Britain). According to the index of progressivity
used (the Kakwani index), the Dutch system was
marginally less regressive than the American. Out-
of-pocket payments were found to be particularly
regressive in the United States, whilst in the
Netherlands sick fund contributions and private
insurance premiums combined were found to be
significantly regressive. Of the three countries whose
health care delivery systems we looked at—Britain,
Italy, and the Netherlands—two were found to
exhibit inequity favouring the rich (Britain and
Italy), though of the two Britain seemed less equitable.
In the case of the Netherlands we discovered inequity
favouring the rich only in the case of the 'health not
good' health indicator in the case of the chronic
illness indicator the inequity favoured the poor. All
three countries displayed inequalities in chronic ill-
health. Of the three, Britain recorded the highest
degree of inequality.
The implication of these results is that Britain tends
to fare well in respect of equity in the finance of
health care (at least in so far as progressivity is
concerned) but badly in respect of equity in the
delivery of health care. The opposite seems to be
true of the Netherlands. Our results ought, how-
ever, to be interpreted with some caution, particu-
larly on the delivery side.
One of the problems has already been touched on,
namely the assumption implicit in our approach
that it is only persons who are classified as ill who
receive health care. There is, however, another
difficulty that has not been mentioned. This is the
possibility—discussed by Le Grand (1982)—that
the results reported in Tables 5, 6, and 7 may be
statistical artefacts. They may be caused simply by
differences in the age and sex composition of the
income deciles. It may well be the case, for example,
that the expenditure concentration curve lies below
the illness concentration curve in Italy and Britain
because (i) age affects the amount of expenditure a
person receives when they fall ill, and (ii) age and
income are correlated. Suppose, for example, that
the over-65s receive less treatment when ill than the
under-65s and that the over-65s are concentrated in
the bottom income decile. Then even if there is no
inequity associated with income, the system will
still appear to be inequitable, since the concentration
of over-65s in the bottom income decile will mean
that the share of health care expenditures received
by this decile will be less than their share of ill-
health. As a result, the expenditure concentration
curve will lie below the illness concentration curve.
This suggests that in order to be able to measure
equity property one really needs to take into account
inter-group differences in demographic structure.
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